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proposals within the context of a changing monetary reality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
At first glance it appears that the many forms of the capitalist 
state, and their debt-based monetary systems, have been a 
success story. The private ownership of the means of production, 
and competitive free markets, has been combined to provide the 
most advanced economic system ever known in the history of 
mankind.  Or, at least, this is how capitalist apologetics are 
presented to anyone who has been fortunate enough to be 
brought up in any of the capitalist nations. Individual 
entrepreneurs, in their pursuit of profit, are seen as an expression 
of the liberty of the citizen. Innovation and incentive abound as 
competitive market forces ensure that inefficient firms are 
µZHHGHG¶ out of the system, in a similar fashion WR 'DUZLQ¶V
QRWLRQ RI µQDWXUDO VHOHFWLRQ¶ in species evolution. Adam Smith, 
WKH %ULWLVK µIDWKHU¶ RI FDSLWDOLVP further taught us that the 
µFRQVXPHU LV NLQJ¶ as we are presented with an array of goods 
and services from which to choose, all delivered at low prices 
with optimum quality (Smith 2003). The whole system is then 
ideologically supported by the mainstream economists who, 
inform policy-makers with their complex mathematical formulae 
and modeling. They present a capitalist economic system, 
derived from classical thought, which possesses a harmonious 
equilibrium, which can only be achieved if the authorities avoid 
misguided intervention and any market rigidities are removed. It 
is claimed that the unfettered operation of markets will lead to an 
efficient allocation of resources and economic development. It is 
also assumed that the wealth µWULFNOH-GRZQ¶ WKHRU\ ensures that 
WKH µVSRLOV¶ UHDFK WKH PDUJLQDOLVHG 7KH analogy of the 18th 
century µ)DEOH RI WKH %HHV¶ E\ %HUQDUG 0DQGHYLOOH KDV often 
been used as a rationale for these ideas suggesting that (in the 
story), as bees pursue their own interest, they subsequently 
maximise the efficiency of the beehive as a whole (Mandeville 
1997). However, if this description of events is not the common 
H[SHULHQFHIRURUGLQDU\SHRSOHWKH\DUHMXVWH[SHFWHGWRµEHOLHYH¶
thaW LW ZLOO EH DFKLHYHG 0HDQZKLOH WKH HFRQRPLVW¶V DQDO\VHV
VHUYH WR µP\VWLI\¶ FDSLWDOLVP DQG REIXVFDWH LWV SURFHVVHV
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rendering (effective) critical appraisal beyond the reach of the 
average person.  Alan Freeman, a well-known heterodox 
economist, has likened this mainstream capitalist ideology to a 
religion, where a hierarchical priesthood are responsible for the 
theological complexities and deliver their edicts (in creed format) 
to the worshipping masses (Freeman 2008). Faith in the 
principles of the creed is encouraged, regardless of any 
individual revelation or perception to the contrary, and any 
critical evaluation is discouraged on the grounds that this 
constitutes µVSLULWXDOly¶ insubordinate (and ignorant) behaviour. 
 
Yet, are these ideas presented above an accurate reflection of 
capitalist reality? The argument of this chapter is that, in many 
respects, they are not. Whilst there are clear positive attributes of 
the economic system that has now come to dominate global 
affairs, there are other aspects that have failed to meet the needs 
and aspirations of contemporary society. To this end it is 
suggested that fundamental (radical) transformations are 
required, rather than a mere µPDUJLQDO¶ WLQNHULQJ with the 
(perceived) imperfections, LI WKHUH LV WR EH WKH W\SH RI µVRFLDO
FDSLWDOLVP¶ WKDW DGKHUHV WR WKH LPSHUDWLYHV RI VRFLDO DQG
economic justice. So, what is wrong? 
 
Firstly, whilst facilitating huge increases of output, the capitalist 
system has created the greatest inequalities of income and wealth 
that have ever existed, both within states and between states. 
Most of the so-FDOOHG µGHYHORSPHQW JDS¶ EHWZHHQ QRUWK DQG
south, for instance, has been created since the µGDUNVDWDQLFPLOOV¶
of the industrial revolution (Adams 1993)0DQ\RI WKHZRUOG¶V
poor simply do not have even their basic needs met, as a 
consequence of being permanently excluded from many markets 
through insufficient monies, a process that is euphemistically 
entitled the lack RI µHIIHFWLYH GHPDQG¶ E\ HFRQRPLVWV ,Q
addition, the processes of inexorable capital accumulation mean 
that these inequalities are increasing. Since this accumulation is 
also indispensable to the normal operation of capitalist 
competition, as Marx put it µDFFXPXODWH DFFXPXODWH - that is 
0RVHV DQG WKH SURSKHWV¶ (p.742), it is therefore (arguably) 
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unavoidable (Marx 1976). Technological and strategic industrial 
developments have also displaced workers to the extent that a 
WKLUG RI WKH JOREDO µZRUNLQJ SRSXODWLRQ¶ DUH QRZ FODVVLILHG Ds 
µXQGHU-HPSOR\HG¶ GHILQHG DV KDYLQJ LQVXIILFLHQW LQFRPH WR
surpass the poverty line. The UK economist Keynes had argued 
that the failure to provide full-employment and redistribute 
LQFRPHZHUHWKHWZRµHFRQRPLFLOOV¶RIDQ\VRFLHW\DQGWRGDWH 
capitalism has failed in both (Keynes 1936). Whilst there is some 
merit to the wealth µWULFNOH-GRZQ¶ HIIHFW WKH HYLGHQFH RI
substantial numbers of adults forced to scavenge in rubbish tips 
in the developing world suggests otherwise. In addition, a billion 
RI WKH ZRUOG¶V SRSXODWLRQ OLYH ZLWKRXW DFFHVV WR FOHDQ GULQNLQJ
water. If two centuries (five depending on your definition) of 
capitalist progress is judged by such criteria, we can safely 
conclude it has failed to deliver. 
 
Secondly, the relentless search for new commercial activity 
means that as many entities as possible become commodities (to 
be bought and sold in markets) regardless of any real human need 
for the produce.  Since business organisations depend upon 
continually sustained sales in order to remain viable, thereby 
maintaining the incomes of stakeholders, as capitalism has 
evolved so product life-cycles have shortened and obsolescence 
becomes part of the overall (deliberate) product design. There is 
also substantial contemporary evidence to suggest that certain 
(non-existent) human needs have been consciously manufactured 
in order to facilitate more commercial activity.  Whilst we might 
deplore some of these more unethical marketing techniques, we 
also need to recognise that this is the normal modus operandi of 
an economic system where the livelihood (and relative 
endowments) of society members depend upon what can be sold 
rather than deriving from the outcome of a deliberate (political) 
planning process. Furthermore, many workers are alienated from 
their own produce (since it is sold) and their µvalue¶ to society 
appears solely determined by their ability to contribute toward 
commercial saleability. Meanwhile, workers that contribute 
towards the well-being of society without any commercial 
remuneration, such as housewives, are under-compensated and, 
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the government reluctance to levy tax for the (necessary) state-
provision of public goods often leads to chronic under-funding 
and is often, therefore, less than satisfactory. 
 
A third, yet related, failure of capitalism is the huge waste of 
resources. The past two hundred years has witnessed the 
XQSUHFHGHQWHG H[SORLWDWLRQ RI PXFK RI WKH ZRUOG¶V VHDV ODQG
fossil fuels, minerals and vegetation leaving many essential and 
non-renewable resources dangerously (and unsustainably) 
depleted.   The economic text books, conversely, suggest to us 
that capitalist incentives lead to the optimum (technical) 
efficiency for industrial production ± the lowest possible 
production costs, that implies resources are being utilised 
sparingly. This might indeed be the case for individual 
production units but the aggregate production level, including the 
large quantity of unnecessary produce, is clearly detrimental to 
sustainability.  Furthermore, as business organisations start and 
fail in the market, the liquidation of corporate assets and new 
business investment spending, leads to further resource 
consumption. This depletion would, arguably, not have taken 
place (at the same rate) if production in different sectors had been 
determined by a deliberate and rational planning process ± either 
by a centralised state or local communities.  Post-war western 
governments have also exacerbated these developments by 
emphasising economic growth as a policy objective, although 
many DVSHFWVRI WKH µJUHHQDJHQGD¶KDYe recently been adopted 
by policy-makers and some positive changes are now evident.  
 
Fourthly, whilst there are clear benefits of competition, 
capitalism also tends to create some unhealthy forms that then 
mitigate the establishment of closer-knit communities in society 
and also reduces the potential for synergistic cooperative 
business activities. Capitalist ideologues suggest, however, that 
competitive practices are an appropriate deployment of the 
positive attributes of human nature. Yet, individuals can find 
themselves in conflict with their compatriots, and often only 
achieve career or market success at the expense of others. 
Corporate decision-makers are also subjected to intense market 
6 
 
competition and find that there are incentives to engage in 
µXQIDLU¶FRPSHWLWLRQ, in the form of predatory restrictive practices 
(that hinder rivals) or the establishment of illegal collusions, 
which can force µHIILFLHQW¶EXVLQHVVHV out of the market. There is 
also a tendency for competitive firms to protect their own 
technologies in a labyrinth of international patents, rather than 
gain potential synergies that would be derived from research 
collaboration. Duplication of resource-use also occurs. 
Furthermore, as capitalism has evolved, the firms have grown 
larger WKURXJK WKH GULYH IRU µHFRQRPLHV RI VFDOH¶, capital 
accumulation and technological advance. As a consequence, 
many global markets are now dominated by a handful of large 
firms. $GDP 6PLWK LQ WKHRULVLQJ µSHUIHFW¶ FRPSHWLtion,  had 
UHFRJQLVHG WKH QHFHVVLW\ WR DYRLG µPRQRSRO\ FDSLWDOLVP¶, since 
this would lead to inefficiency and disadvantage the consumer, 
and he subsequently advocated the implementation of effective 
state regulation (Smith 2003). Yet, in more recent times, national 
and regional competition policies have, despite some success, 
been rather weak in regulating the multinationals (Mouatt 1996).  
 
Finally, as Ingham notes, the historical development of 
capitalism has produced its own unique debt-based money 
system that (my emphasis), as shall be discussed more fully later 
in the chapter, is fraught with specific difficulties and a raft of 
(arguably) unethical practices that have become institutionally 
regularized (Ingham 2001). The other deficiencies of capitalism, 
that have been outlined above, whilst worthy of investigation are 
beyond the remit of this chapter.  
 
The chapter begins by outlining the modern capitalist state and 
explores the notion that there has been an erosion of sovereignty 
in favour of large enterprise and the private banking 
infrastructure. Yet, whilst there is no doubt that the (social) 
power of banks has increased in recent decades, there are many 
contemporary signs of systemic weakness. The chapter 
investigates these developments within the context of ideas 
derived from the monetary reform movement. It is then 
suggested that the transformations proposed, whilst radical, leave 
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much of the modus operandi of capitalism intact. The chapter 
DOVRGLVFXVVHVYDULRXVµJUDVVURRW¶DOWHUQDWLYHDQGFRPSOHPHQWDU\
currencies, probably best associated with Bernard Lietaer. Binary 
economics is then explored, as a possible exception to the reform 
campaigns that do not propose structural changes to capitalist 
operation outside of the financial system. The chapter then deals 
with the realpolitik of the modern political environment and 
suggests that post-Keynesian monetary notions offer more 
achievable, albeit compromised, solutions to the financial 
dilemmas. The chapter ends with discussion of a (personal) 
proposal for a micro investment bank, which could (it is hoped), 
in conjunction with other measures, contribute to the overall 
pursuit of social and economic justice. 
 
 
THE CAPITALIST STATE 
 
It is generally considered, by the unsuspecting public, that the 
issue and the regulation of the functioning of money is the 
responsibility of the state. Whilst this is true in some respects, it 
is not usually understood that 97% of the money supply in the 
United Kingdom (even more in the US) is issued by the private 
(albeit licensed) commercial banks, in the form of credit-money, 
that substantially profit from the exercise (Shakespeare 2002). 
So, what is the precise monetary (and other) role of the state?  
The modern nation-state, consisting of a legislature, judiciary, 
bureaucracy, armed forces, courts and police, has been in 
existence since the peace of Westphalia in 1648. According to 
the particular constitutional arrangements, the state has 
jurisdiction within a certain geographical boundary for, the 
initiation and implementation of law, economic management 
(including monetary affairs), international relations, defence, and 
the general well-being of society. There are, of course, several 
ways of theorising the nature of the state (Vincent 1987). Yet, 
since the instigation of the globalisation discourse and the 
development of supra-national organisations, it appears that the 
sovereignty of the state has been increasingly brought into 
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question, with a corresponding democratic deficit. As Susan 
Strange once put it:  
 
³Where states were once the masters of markets, now it is the 
markets which, on many crucial issues, are the masters over the 
governments of states. And the declining authority of states is 
reflected in a growing diffusion of authority to other institutions 
and associations, and to local and regional bodies, and in a 
growing asymmetry between the larger states with structural 
power and weaker ones without it (p.4)´(Strange 1996). 
 
Several factors have been at work, and I am going to mention 
two.  Firstly, since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods fixed 
exchange-rate system in 1973, floating rates have led to greater 
trading risks which, have contributed towards the exponential 
growth of multinational corporations as an alternative to 
international trade. These foreign direct investments have been a 
main driver of growth in emerging economies around the world 
in recent years. Governments, as the research of Stopford and 
Strange has identified, have noted this correlation and often 
compete with each other to create a favourable environment in 
order to attract inward investment (Stopford 1991). Nation-states 
have found that their employment levels, output, knowledge 
transfer receipt, current account balances and competitive 
environment, have improved following inward investment flows. 
This means in practice, of course, that states are deterred from 
pursuing economic and industrial policies that are contrary to the 
demands of the multinationals, and sovereignty is thus restricted. 
 
Secondly, the exponential growth in international capital flows, 
and the deregulation of financial markets, has further contributed 
towards the erosion of state sovereignty. Nowadays huge 
volumes of money, controlled by hedge funds or other private 
investors, circulate global markets for foreign exchange, capital, 
stock, or derivatives with minimal state (or inter-state) 
regulation. This means that, as Griffith-Jones notes, with limited 
capacity to influence capital movements, the state has little 
control over exchange rates, interest rates or the market prices of 
9 
 
financial securities. National banks, for instance, now have much 
smaller currency reserves in relation to privately owned 
quantities and are virtually powerless to influence exchange rates 
using open market operations. Interest rate policy is the only 
instrument at their disposal, restricting their choices for the rate. 
State development agendas, consisting of fiscal, monetary and 
industrial policies are, therefore, impaired (Griffith-Jones 1998). 
In addition, as Killick has noted, weaker states with external debt 
problems find themselves subjected to severe structural 
adjustment policies, administered through the International 
Monetary Fund or World Bank, that further undermine state-
sovereignty and can contribute toward poverty (Killick 1995). 
 
In order to combat these global developments, there presumably 
would need to be concerted multilateral (inter-state) cooperation, 
in order to regulate the international financial markets and actors 
involved. The monetary reform movement, conversely, tends to 
focus more on national financial systems, since these are 
perceived to be the political arenas where effective state 
intervention can be mustered. Yet, of course, this could also be 
considered to be a precursor of closer international monetary 
collaboration at some point in the future. 
 
 
THE MONETARY REFORM MOVEMENT 
 
The monetary reform movement has antecedents that are often 
traced as far as the events leading to the American War of 
Independence, during the eighteenth century. Ellen Brown, a 
monetary reformer, explains how the colonialists, faced with 
shortages of money, issued their own paper currency leading to a 
sustained period of productive stability, poverty-alleviation and 
full-employment. On a visit to England, during the eighteenth 
century, Benjamin Franklin had commented on the relative level 
of poverty and unemployment that existed in London and 
attributed this to a private debt-based (scarce) money system. 
When asked to explain the relative prosperity of the colonies he 
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stated that the issue of paper money by the authorities was the 
reason for success, providing that it was created: 
 
 «LQ SURSHU SURSRUWLRQV WR WKH GHPDQGV RI WUDGH DQG
LQGXVWU\ «ZH also (my emphasis) issue it to pay the 
governments approved expenses and charities. We make sure it is 
issued in proper proportions to make the goods easily pass from 
WKH SURGXFHUV WR WKH FRQVXPHUV«,Q WKLV PDQQHU FUHDWLQJ IRU
ourselves our own paper money, we control its purchasing 
power, and we have no interest to pay to no one. You see, a 
legitimate government can both spend and lend money into 
circulation, while banks can only lend significant amounts of 
their promissory bank notes, for they can neither give away nor 
spend but a tiny fraction of the money people need. Thus, there is 
always a debt principal to be returned and usury to be paid. The 
result is that you have always too little credit in circulation to 
give the workers full employment. You do not have too many 
workers, you have too little money in circulation, and that which 
circulates, all bears the endless burden of unpayable debt and 
usury... (Brown 2007). 
 
This view clearly posits that the sensible state control, regulation 
and issue of money - with a restrained role for the private 
banking sector - were the preferable options. Under the 
µPennsylvania plan¶ for instance, the colonial authorities issued 
debt-free money for government projects, in place of taxes, and 
also discovered that it was non-inflationary. In addition, credit 
monies were provided for the private sector at 5% interest rather 
than the more prohibitive 8% charged by the private bankers. The 
colonial financial system was heralded as a success in 
Pennsylvania (and other colonies) but unfortunately, in New 
England, an over-issue of notes led to its depreciation and this 
began to affect the investments of British merchants. In dealing 
with the colonial issue in 1751 George II (and continued under 
George III in 1752), also being anxious to retain the colonies in 
their role as suppliers of raw materials, decided to issue a decree 
banning the issue of new paper money in New England, forcing 
them to borrow from the British bankers instead. Franklin noted 
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that within a year beggars had returned to the streets and, 
gradually, sentiments rose in the colonies until there was 
sufficient revolutionary fervour to challenge the British in the 
war of independence. This account of the American revolution 
origins, as Brown notes, has been verified by other notable 
historians since (Brown 2007). Furthermore, liquidity scarcity is 
a recurrent thHPHLQKLVWRU\'XULQJWKH.H\QHVLDQµJROGHQ-DJH¶
RI WKH ILIWLHV DQG VL[WLHV IRU LQVWDQFH WKH DYDLODELOLW\ RI µFKHDS
PRQH\¶ (low interest rates) is often cited as a major contributing 
factor to the prevailing (favourable) macroeconomic climate 
(Pettifor 2006). Even the monetarist Friedman had cited the 
Federal Reserve credit squeeze as the key contributory factor to 
the preceding depression years. It appears that the lack of liquid 
resources is often the prelude to economic strife, leading to 
subsequent political and social instability. 
 
The essential point to be derived from this is that the debt-based 
money system, controlled by the private banking infrastructure, 
is seen as the problem by contemporary monetary reformers. 
When credit-money is created, through the production of loans, 
there is only enough circulating currency to repay the principal of 
the loan without the interest, the so-FDOOHGµLPSRVVLEOHFRQWUDFW¶
and the system relies upon the further expansion of credit in 
order to service existing debt. If compounded interest is also 
taken in to consideration the problem is far worse (Kennedy 
1995). The anti-debt campaigner, Ann Pettifor, has likened this 
(impossible) FUHGLWSURFHVV WRDJDPHRI µPXVLFDOFKDLUV¶ZKHUH
the inevitability of default is intrinsic to the system as someone is 
H[SHFWHGWREHOHIWµKROGLQJWKHFKDLU¶ (Pettifor 2006). As credit-
money grows in relation to fiat money, the problem deepens.  At 
the time of WWII, µhigh-powered¶ money (notes and coins) 
constituted approximately 50% of the money supply whereas it 
now only constitutes 3% in the UK, and less than 1% in the US 
(Shakespeare 2002). In addition to the implausible mathematics 
of a debt-based system, as several reformers have noted backed 
by empirical work, there is the inflationary impact of interest on 
the productive economy (Kennedy 1995). Firms, consumers and 
governments all need to find additional revenue in order to meet 
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interest payments and this puts substantial pressure on prices, 
resources and the environment. It is further argued that private 
commercial banks receive this substantial tribute in return for a 
service to the productive economy of questionable value ± in 
other words µPRQH\IRUQRWKLQJ¶ (El Diwany 2003). 
 
This, of course, is not new. 7KH µIUDFWLRQDOO\- EDFNHG¶ JROG
certificates of the goldsmiths, as an early form of credit money, 
has often been mooted as an antecedent for modern (private) 
commercial banking. Yet, whilst the goldsmiths had to ensure 
that issued notes were an appropriate multiple of guarded specie 
deposits in the vaults, their modern private banker counterparts 
are not subject to de facto reserve restraints. When commercial 
banks make loans they simply become accounting entries on their 
assets and liabilities sheets and, the (then circulating) deposit 
bank-monies are therefore literally created  ex nihilo - µout of 
QRWKLQJ¶ GLVSHOOLQJ WKH IDOODFLRXV YLHZ WKDW WKH\ DUH DFWXDOO\
formed from deposits that already exist.  Money is, therefore, 
issued endogenously and demand-led. Monetary reformers 
IXUWKHUH[SODLQKRZWKH%ULWLVKµWDOO\-VWLFN¶V\VWHPRIDFFRXQWLQJ
had been replaced by the Free Coinage Act of 1666, which had 
enabled private money-issue. The development of the Bank of 
England in 1694IROORZLQJWKHµJORULRXVUHYROXWLRQ¶KDGgranted 
private investors license to produce legal tender, in order to lend 
to the government and business. Up until this point, the British 
monarchs (or their agents) had been responsible for their own 
currency issue, suggesting that William of Orange had been 
drafted in by aspiring bankers in order to legitimate this specific 
purpose. This new private issue of debt, that served as legal 
tender money, therefore established the statutory and common-
law principle for a de facto private banking cartel to be able to 
extract substantial tribute from the wealth and income of the 
productive economy ever since. Whilst the state has experienced 
periods of stronger intervention in monetary matters, such as the 
period following the great depression, this has been short-lived. 
Following WWII, for instance, as Helleiner has noted, the private 
bankers (and sympathetic politicians) were vociferous in 
lobbying for an increased role for the commercial banks (relative 
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to the state) in the financial system, through the advocacy of 
substantial deregulation, arguably to the detriment of the state 
and productive structure (Helleiner 1994). 
 
However, although this might appear to be negative reporting of 
retail banking per se, most thinkers recognize that there are 
significant social and economic benefits of such activities, and 
these are therefore not the target for campaigners. Yet, all 
monetary reformers do clearly seek, at the very least, a stronger 
µILQDQFLDO¶ VWDWH, alongside effectively regulated private 
commercial banking.  In the third millennium some argue that 
this is no longer a desirable option but is essential.  The levels of 
consumer, corporate and state debt have reached such alarming 
proportions that it will not be long before this becomes 
unsustainable, where servicing interest payments is no longer 
possible. The largest debtor in the world, for instance, is the 
United States, with federal debt presently running at $7.713 
trillion, and at current trends they are predicted to reach 
µXQVXVWDLQDEiOLW\¶ ZLWKLQ WKH QH[W IHZ \HDUV as annual interest 
exceeds taxation receipts.  Since the dollar is used as the global 
reserve currency, with foreign central banks and institutional 
investors holding substantial amounts of this debt, the 
ramifications of a major default are colossal. If the United States 
reneges on its debt, serious dollar devaluation is likely to follow. 
Ellen Brown has outlined several ways in which the US 
government (in collaboration with the major private banks) has 
sought to obfuscate these financial realities, under the guise of 
maintaining (necessary) public confidence in the money system. 
Measures include the provision of large funds for entities such as 
the Working Group on Financial Markets, the Exchange 
Stabilization Fund and the Counterparty Risk Management 
Policy Group (CRMPG) in order to influence prices in stock, 
bond and currency markets by instigating specific sales and 
purchases. The ostensible aim is to avoid crises and shocks that 
are likely to stem from the de facto underlying fundamentals and 
undermine the general market confidence. Yet this, as Brown 
notes, creates opportunities for the political manipulation of 
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financial markets and the general prices of any securities traded 
(Brown 2007). 
 
The current global financial system appears to have several 
features that suggest the (market) prices of financial products are 
often not determined by the traditional forces of supply and 
demand anymore but, are fashioned instead by the whims of 
those decision-makers that control large volumes of funds 
circulating the globe. Hedge funds, for instance, which are able 
to leverage substantial sums of credit-money (with minimal 
collateral) for purposes of short-term speculative activity in 
derivative, stock, bond and currency markets can, effectively, 
actually cause prices to rise or fall contrary to the underlying 
fundamentals. This, of course, leads to misleading price signals 
for the smaller investors. To complicate matter further Ellen 
Brown further suggests that, a private banking cartel finances and 
manipulates all of the mainstream mass media which then 
H[DFHUEDWHV WKHSUREOHP7KHVHµEHDU-UDLGV¶KDYHEHHQOLQNHGWR
various currency crises in Russia, Malaysia, Argentina and 
Mexico as well as various historic stock market fluctuations 
OHDGLQJ WR FRUSRUDWH µPRQRSROLVDWLRQ¶ activities. These recent 
currency shocks, and other crises, have led to numerous calls for 
the restoration of multilateral regulation of the global financial 
system, experienced during the Bretton Woods era, through the 
use of capital controls and/or new proposed measures such as 
exchange rate regimes or WKH µ7RELQ WD[¶ that would tax 
speculative international capital flows (Palley; Tobin 1978; 
Patomaki 2003). 
 
So, there is general agreement on the nature of the perceived 
international problems but reformers posit varying proposals for 
the transformation of domestic financial systems. Stephen 
Zarlenga for instance, from the American Monetary Institute 
based in Chicago, suggests that the state should create a legally 
VDQFWLRQHG µPRQH\ RI DFFRXQW¶ WKDW JUDGXDOO\ UHSODFHV FUHGLW-
money to become 100% of the money supply. The money is 
provided interest and debt free (Zarlenga 2002). These ideas are 
supported by Joseph Huber and James Robertson in their 2000 
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book Creating New Money. Under these proposals the money is 
not backed by specie, only by the force of law, and the private 
banks are only permitted to conduct lending on a 100% 
fractionally backed system (Huber 2000).  In his historical study 
of the political economy of money Zarlenga explains how the use 
of specie had led to significant inefficiencies, derived from 
misdirected energies in the production of metals, and often the 
establishment of a plutocracy that hoarded bullion for the 
manipulation of political purposes. He further recommends that 
the issue and regulation of this (un-backed money) become a 
IRXUWKµDUP¶RIWKHVWDWHZLth a substantial measure of autonomy, 
which is constitutionally established. Yet, there are critics. The 
Canadian veteran reformer William Krehm, for instance, has 
opposed the Zarlenga 100% approach on the basis that this would 
lead to a centralization of financial power in the hands of the 
state that, at least potentially, may lead to state abuse. He favours 
instead a 50/50 system that will deliver many of the benefits of 
reform yet maintain a (safer) plurality of social powers through 
public and private involvement in the money-isssue 
(McConnachie 2006). Michael Rowbotham, in The Grip of 
Death, also advocates a similar proportional state money-issue 
policy (Rowbotham 1998). In addition James Gibb Stuart, the so-
FDOOHGµIDWKHU¶RI%ULWLVKPRQHWDU\UHIRUPalso supports a similar 
DSSURDFKWKDWEHJLQVZLWKWKHµPRQHWDULVDWLRQ¶RIWKHLQWHUHVWRQ
the national debt, whilst leaving much of the private banking 
system intact (McConnachie 2006). 
 
Islamists also have their monetary ideas. Under Islamic law the 
practice of receiving interest (riba) is forbidden. The literal 
translation of riba is increase, although it is usually understood as 
usury, which can be extracted when credit is extended or derived 
from trade. These are termed Riba al Qarud and Riba al-Buyu 
respectively (El Diwany 2003).  This, of course, presents 
difficulties for economic policy-makers (and bankers) who are 
seeking to implement religious law as well as making it 
problematic for Moslems living in non-Islamic financial systems. 
This is because when monies are provided in the form of credit 
there needs to be incentives for parting with liquidity (assuming 
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that credit is derived from existing deposits) and the levying of 
administration costs, even without the extraction of profit for 
financial rentiers. Islamic banks, and western financial 
institutions that provide for Moslems, devise specialist services 
that seek to meet these religious requirements. Islamic economic 
law also (ideally) requires the elimination of the present 
fractional reserve system, in favour of a 100% backed (interest-
free) fiat money system without credit monies. In this system 
money would simply circulate, via the intermediaries, and the 
financial authorities would need to ensure that sufficient liquidity 
and money supply growth was provided to meet the demands of 
industriousness, commercial activity and economic growth. Also, 
a further feature of Islamic finance is the provision of capital. 
Whenever money is needed as capital for productive purposes, 
the Islamic expectation is that profit-sharing (and risk-sharing) 
between investor and productive capitalist takes place. In this 
regard the capital provider, or financial intermediary acting like 
an investment bank on behalf of the investor, receives a 
proportion of net profit or bears the relevant loss. Some Islamic 
economists also recommend the establishment of a commodity-
money standard, as backing for the currency, as well as the 
elimination of fractional reserve banking. Finally, there are also 
various pieces of Islamic law that (comprehensively) cover 
aspects of financial propriety. In order for these policies to be 
adopted, of course, an Islamic state would be needed to ensure 
the enforcement of the relevant monetary principles, the 
development of new contract law and regulatory supervision. 
This, however, would necessitate a centralisation of social power, 
in favour of the imams and mullahs, and is therefore unlikely to 
be an acceptable option outside of the Muslim communities.  
 
Notwithstanding these policy differences, the monetary reform 
movement (including Islamists) claims that all of their proposed 
measures will be anti-inflationary, since the principal cause of 
inflation has been removed. By implication, therefore, the 
reformers also challenge the mainstream conception of the 
causes RILQIODWLRQZKLFKSUHVXSSRVHµTXDQWLW\WKHRU\RIPRQH\¶
explanations, and emphasize instead the substantive role of debt-
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driven inflation. 7KLVµGHEW-GULYHU¶WKHRU\SRVLts that the interest 
on debt reduces incomes and revenues and subsequently, creates 
pressures to raise prices and wages in order to compensate - 
inducing inflation. It is also further considered that debt puts 
pressure on the environment, since the need to repay interest as 
well as principal necessitates a greater level of economic activity. 
 
Monetary reform, of course, does not have to focus exclusively 
on the µFHQWUDOLVHG¶ PDFUR±level since there are substantial 
grassroots solutions to the debt-based money system, discussed 
later, that have been propounded and practiced. These include 
complementary currencies, which co-exist with official currency, 
or local exchange trading schemes (LETS) that have contributed 
much towards social and economic development around the 
world. Yet, the monetary reform proposals (mentioned above) 
point towards a state-led (radical) transformation of the present 
system that would undoubtedly contribute towards notions of 
social and economic justice. But, do they take accurate account 
of the reality of capitalism as an integrated whole? This is a 
really important question since a radical financial transformation 
that enables capitalism to operate more equitably, yet leaves the 
modus operandi of the economic system intact, may find that the 
same failures mentioned at the beginning of this chapter (such as 
resource depletion) persist. The two central arguments of this 
chapter are that, firstly, reformers would benefit from a more 
holistic notion of capitalism - perhaps best understood by Marx, 
and secondly, there are current changes to the contemporary 
monetary reality that suggest that the bankers are not as powerful 
as the reform movement  has posited. These considerations will 
now be discussed in turn. 
 
 
MARX AND CAPITALIST MODES OF PRODUCTION 
 
It has often been suggested that Marx predicted the collapse of 
capitalism. Yet, whilst some adhere to this view, many do not. 
Andrew Kliman, for instance, based on substantial textual 
review, suggests that whilst Marx predicted inevitable capitalist 
18 
 
crises, several countervailing factors could mitigate the 
likelihood of complete collapse (Kliman 2007). Be that as it may, 
WKHFHQWUDO WKUXVWRI0DU[¶s political economy identifies private 
capital as the root cause of the exploitative nature of the 
HFRQRPLF V\VWHP ,W ZDV WKLV µRZQHUVKLS DQG FRQWURO¶ RI WKH
means of production, in conjunction with accumulated financial 
resources, that separated his bourgeoisie class of people from the 
proletariat and enables them to extract a surplus (value) in labour 
terms i.e. profit. In time, of course, this leads to substantial 
income and wealth inequalities. A monetary reform proposal, 
that leaves capital privately owned, would not solve this market 
failure. Furthermore, as capitalism evolves, Marx posited that the 
ownership of capital would be concentrated in the hands of an 
increasingly smaller (corporate) power elite. This is not 
necessarily the result of the manipulation and ambition of 
industrialists, but is driven by the logic of the system itself. The 
competitive process per se forces weaker firms in to liquidation 
and, technological advances aQG WKH QHHG IRU µHFRQRPLHV RI
VFDOH¶QHFHVVLWDWHODUJHUILUPVWKHULVLQJRUJDQLFFRPSRVLWLRQRI
FDSLWDO LQ 0DU[¶V WHUPLQRORJ\ &RPSDQLHV WKHUHIRUH VLPSO\
have no choice in the matter. 
 
Marx also argued that the logical outcome of this competitive 
process was the falling rate of profit (defined in his own terms) 
which would lead to recurring crises in order to restore 
profitability. In order to fully discuss this (perhaps) counter-
intuitive idea, there really needs to be an exposition of Marxian 
economic analysis beyond the remit of this chapter. Yet, in 
general terms, Marx was arguing that, as capitalists adopted 
µPRUH productive labour-VDYLQJ WHFKQRORJLHV¶ SURILW UDWHV SHU
monetary unit of capital advanced) would tend to fall. This was 
because Marx viewed value as determined by (abstract) labour 
time and, increasingly larger outlay on fixed capital (machines 
etc) would not be financially rewarded in the market due to lower 
product prices. When a crisis occurs, however, the falling rate 
tendency can be offset and profitability can be restored because 
the means of production are cheapened (Kliman 2007).  Anyway, 
the main point to be derived from this is that, the proposals of the 
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monetary reform movement per se will not remove this 
underlying (and empirically observed) reality of capitalism. 
 
In his general analysis of the evolution of capitalism, Marx had 
also posited that industrial capital, in the form of capitalist 
entrepreneurs and decision-makers, would subjugate 
(autonomous) financial capitalists, which are manifested in the 
private banking infrastructure. His rationale for this was that 
interest-bearing capital (money-lending for business investment) 
derives from the capitalist production process (and is therefore 
ultimately dependent on it) and further that commercial credit 
was a secondary function (merely concerned with facilitating 
circulation) to the value-adding production process (p.468) 
(Marx 1971).  
 
Yet, shortly after Marx, events appeared to contradict his 
prediction. The rise of the joint-stock firm in the late nineteenth 
century, for instance, suggested that (investment) banks had 
gained decision-making power over the corporate(s) through 
integration (see later) - the Hilferding notion of finance capital 
(Hilferding 1910). Substantial tribute is also, of course, extracted 
from the economy in the form of interest by the private banks. 
Furthermore, the financial institutions, hedge funds and private-
equity firms of today, WKDW µVKRUW-seOO¶ OHYHUDJHG IXQGV that are 
authorised by the decisions of private bankers, are able to 
manipulate currency and stock prices that can belie the market 
fundamentals and bamboozle small investors. Redistributive 
accumulation, asset stripping, and corporate monopolization can 
then follow any subsequent currency (or share-price) shock. It 
seems that finance (and those that control it) has triumphed. This, 
of course, is a central point of the monetary reform movement. 
Yet, there are contemporary signs of systemic weakness in the 
financial system. Banks are increasingly exposed to the vagaries 
of international financial markets and earn a smaller proportion 
of profit from interest. In addition, firms are now less dependent 
on the bankers, as a result of retained profits, and are also further 
developing their own monies, payment systems and banks. This 
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financial innovation, with new circulation channels, requires a re-
think on (modern) money.  
 
In tracing these monetary developments it appears that, largely as 
a result of the information revolution, a latent corporate monetary 
system - derived from new monies and technologies, is emerging 
that challenges prevailing monetary notions. This new 
corporafinance (my phrase) system is perhaps poised to replace 
the present financial system, comprised of commercial and 
investment banks, in the event of a major monetary collapse. 
Even if this failed to materialize, the corporations, hungry for 
profit, are increasingly encroaching upon the core business 
activities of the private banks. In the final analysis industrial 
capital might, as Marx had thought, subjugate autonomous 
financial capital. 
 
General monetary discourse , as Niebyl noted in his review of the 
classical period, is often problematic since the theoretical 
development and empirical work on money has predominantly 
pertained to a specific historical context (Niebyl 1946). 
Consequently, abstract theories of money, that can be universally 
applied, are often non-existent or impractical.  Furthermore, 
monetary theorists (often from the same school of thought) have 
historically disagreed on the origin, nature and function of money 
per se. Notwithstanding, much of the prevailing monetary 
thinking has been loosely based upon ideas formed during the 
industrial revolution (IR) and its immediate aftermath ± the very 
context that Marx formulated his thinking. Marx begins by 
LGHQWLI\LQJWKHµROGHU¶IRUPVRIFDSLWDODQGVWDWHVKLVFDVH 
 
³7KHFRPPHUFLDODQGLQWHUHVW-bearing forms of capital are older 
than industrial capital, which, in the capitalist mode of 
production, is the basic form of the capital relations dominating 
bourgeois society ± and all other forms are only derived from it 
or secondary: derived as is the case with interest-bearing 
capital; secondary means that the capital fulfils a special 
function (which belongs to the circulation process) as for 
instance commercial capital. In the course of its evolution, 
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industrial capital must therefore subjugate those forms and 
transform them into special functionV RI LWVHOI´ (p.468)(Marx 
1971) 
 
Interest-bearing capital, of course, is loaned (by the owners) at 
interest to industrial capitalists and therefore depends upon the 
production plans taking place.  Marx further argued that, as 
capitalism developed, the subjugation of this capital form results 
IURPWZRSURFHVVHV)LUVWWKHµYLROHQFH¶RIWKHbourgeois) state 
would lead to the enforcement of lower interest rates, to the 
benefit of industrial capitalists who then gain a larger proportion 
of surplus value. Secondly, the subjugation derives from the 
emerging (bourgeois) credit system (money created ex nihilo) 
that, Marx sees as a purposeful creation of the capitalist mode of 
production, in order to gain the surplus value traditionally 
extracted by the usurers. He further predicts this credit system 
evolving as the scale of manufacture increases. The banking 
industry indeed experienced a major transformation, throughout 
the IR, and new financial structures were (arguably) one of the 
main drivers.   Deane, for instance, explored the role of the banks 
during this time and concluded that the emergent banking 
structures enabled capital to be raised, to fund the development 
of factories, and provided a means to save and reinvest 
accumulated wealth (Deane 1988). In a similar way the current 
Information Revolution (IR2) is resulting in its own set of 
changes to monetary structures, to meet the needs of the 
emergent electronic and virtual interactions. As the new forms of 
banks and money became the main IR driver, the emergent 
financial structures are likely to be a cornerstone of IR2.  
 
Marx also explains how commercial capital will be subjugated, 
as the merchant (of the Middle Ages) becomes transformed into 
the industrial capitalist. In the former instance, the merchant (and 
FRPPHUFLDOFDSLWDOKDGGRPLQLRQRYHUWKHµSURGXFLQJ¶JXLOGVRU
peasant craftsman, since they chose (or not) to purchase their 
wares. In the latter scenario, the producer is himself the merchant 
DQGFRPPHUFLDOFDSLWDOEHFRPHVVLPSO\DQ³LQWHUPHGLDU\RQO\LQ
WKH FLUFXODWLRQ SURFHVV´ DQG WKHUHIRUH PRUH VXEMHFW WR WKH
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industrial capitalist. This process, of course, becomes even more 
apparent as large-scale production emerges, with modern 
marketing, since the (market) power of the firm is enhanced.  
 
As capitalism developed, following the death of Marx, the 
provision of equities, bonds and loans from the private banking 
infrastructure all came to be considered as financial capital - 
provided for the purposes of the industrial capitalist. Yet, the 
Hilferding argument was that, as the joint-stock firm enabled 
much larger scale production and monopolization, the financial 
arrangements that facilitated this ceased to be cRQGXFWHGDWµDUPV
OHQJWK¶ 7KH EDQNLQJ µGHFLVLRQ-PDNHUV¶ WKHUHIRUH EHFDPH
integrated with the industrial capitalists as a result of corporate 
shareholdings by banks, social links (bank directors appointed to 
corporate boards) and the detailed (bank) knowledge of corporate 
financial transactions. Hilferding considered that, in this context, 
EDQNHUV KDG WKH µXSSHU KDQG¶ DQG HIIHFWLYHO\ GHWHUPLQHG WKH
future trajectory of capitalism (Hilferding 1910). This meant that 
FLUFXPVWDQFHV DSSHDUHG WR EH PRYLQJ DZD\ IURP 0DU[¶V
prediction. To complicate matters further, later on in the 
twentieth century the state enhanced its role in the financial 
system. Yet, the banks were still seen as powerful. 
 
 
THE ERA OF THE FINANCIAL STATE 
 
The immediate aftermath of the depression years had led to calls 
for the state to play a larger role in the financial system. Milton 
Friedman had, for instance, identified a state-driven credit 
squeeze as the root cause of the deflation. Even prior to the 
recession, monetary reformers like Keynes, Wicksell and Fisher, 
had advocated increased (state) monetary policy to combat the 
increased magnitude of the trade cycle oscillations of the early 
twentLHWKFHQWXU\6RWKH%UHWWRQ:RRGVµJROGHQDJH¶HUDEHJDQ
characterized by low interest rates, state-intervention, a fixed 
exchange-rate regime and a dollar-exchange anchor. Yet, as 
Helleiner has noted, the (private) banking lobbyists soon 
pressurized post-war governments towards financial 
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liberalization, in the form of capital control removal and 
deregulation, eager to profit from prospective changes. As soon 
as the dollar came under pressure, coupled with OPEC oil price 
rises, currencies floated and exchange controls were removed. 
There are several calls, of course, in the present era, to re-
establish the multilateral regulation of the international financial 
system in order to mitigate speculation and avert the continuation 
of the currency crises of recent times.  
 
 
LIBERAL FINANCE 
 
As the profit margins of the private banking infrastructure 
increased, during the seventies, it appeared that the financial 
sector was becoming more autonomous from industrial capitalists 
(Griffith-Jones 1998).   It is interesting to note, however, that 
whilst the discourse on financial crises during the eighties and 
nineties tended to emphasise the unregulated volumes of monies, 
circulating around the international financial markets, and the 
autonomous nature of (private) financial agents, the focus is now 
on the vulnerabilities of commercial and investment banks to the 
vagaries of the system.  Interest payments, for instance, now only 
form approximately 20% of bank profits - the remainder being 
sourced from fees, charges, commissions and bank trading 
positions. It has also been estimated that a 12% crash in 
aggregate derivative prices would now lead to the bankruptcy of 
thHPDMRULW\RIWKHZRUOG¶VEDQNV(Brown 2007). If the financial 
state has declined, and the private banking infrastructure is 
showing signs of a profit-squeeze, then which entities have 
gained financial power at their expense? A central argument of 
this paper is that emerging corporate monies (and payment 
systems), corporafinance, are encroaching on the banks core 
activity - driven by the profit-motive (Mouatt 2008).  
 
 
THE RISE OF NONBANKS 
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Even if we reject Marxian notions of the capitalist trajectory, 
where firms seek to realize increasingly more surplus value to 
offset the falling rate of profit, the generally accepted corporate 
imperative is still the pursuit of profit. Yet, as previously stated, 
there are fresh challenges for firms, since IR2 and innovation 
have led to new channels of financial circulation, and financial 
liberalization has also contributed towards a more (competitive) 
global economy. The companies most likely to succeed in this 
environment, as Lietaer noted, are the ones most able to combine 
electronic knowledge systems with production (Lietaer 2001). If 
this is extended to the development of corporate monies, banks 
and payment systems this will further strengthen their 
competitive position. 
 
So nonbanks are playing increasingly significant roles in the 
financial world. Bradford et al have examined their varied roles 
in payment activity, in both traditional and emerging systems. As 
a consequence they have complex relations with the banks and 
payment system users. In addition, since they are rarely directly 
involved with final settlements, they appear, at least, to be less 
associated with systemic risk (Bradford T. 2002). In reality, 
however both banks and nonbanks are susceptible to operational 
risk factors. 
 
A follow-on study by the European Central Bank and Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City further confirmed the growing 
LPSRUWDQFH DQG LQIOXHQFH RI QRQEDQNV S ³5HWDLO SD\PHQWV
systems throughout the world are undergoing fundamental 
change. Traditional paper-based forms of payment are giving 
way to electronic forms of payment. Technology advances are 
making possible new front-end payment instruments and new 
back-end processing methods. New products, business models, 
new markets, and new alliaQFHV DUH DQ HYHU\GD\ RFFXUUHQFH´
(ECB/FRBKC 2007). The margins on internet payment 
transactions, for instance, are lower than ones for traditional 
electronic retail banking and the corporations, through financial 
innovation, are therefore able to further encroach upon traditional 
bank business. 
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Another feature of the new financial landscape is that retailers 
have diversified into financial services, challenging banks in their 
own core markets. Since retailers have strong brands and 
customer responsiveness they often have stronger market 
knowledge. Yet, as Welch and Worthington have identified, 
retailers have so far adopted a selective approach to the provision 
of financial services and do not cover the wider range offered by 
banks (Welch 2007). Notwithstanding, the retailer threat to retail 
banking is likely to continue. Retailers have strong customer 
relations, provide services and tie in customers with reward 
schemes. In addition, a customer is more likely to meet a retail 
manager than a bank manager. Conversely, the banking trend has 
EHHQ WRZDUGV $70V DQG µGLVWDQFH EDQNLQJ¶ GULYHQ E\ FRVW-
saving motives, and bank-customers rarely get to see banking 
personnel. In contrast, retail customers regularly visit their 
preferred retailer for weekly shopping or for a variety of other 
goods such as medicines, mobile phones, kitchen items, white 
goods, electronics goods, books and CDs. Much financial 
innovation by nonbanks, therefore, has been driven by the 
development of closer customer interaction. 
 
The large retailers have also developed a low risk approach to the 
commercial exchange of commodities. Typically customer will 
pay for their weekly shopping bill at the checkout before the 
suppliers have been paid for the very same goods. Indeed, the 
small suppliers can wait for months before receiving payment 
from the large retailers. The low risk approach of retailers 
extends to other aspects of the supply chain relationship. 
Subramani identifies, for instance, that supplier-retailer relations 
are complex and uneven, especially where there are technology 
dominated supply chains, since a small supplier will need 
relationship-specific investments and are effectively locked-in to 
a retailer. The large retailers effectively offload much of the risk 
to their wider supplier network (Subramani 2004). 
  
The Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation, a London 
based think-WDQN DW WKH HQG RI WKH ¶V LQLWLDWHG DQ
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investigation into the "non-bank" phenomenon within Europe 
and how this would impact the retail banking sector. The report 
concluded that the new entrant retail players did pose a serious 
threat for the long term, though the inroads made by retailers at 
the time into the financial sector was limited (Lascelles 1999).  It 
seems that the corporate sector is poised to make a serious impact 
on the retail banking sector, and its financial systems, facilitated 
by technology-led innovations. As with the IR1, our current IR2 
is resulting in the development of a new network of financial 
systems and structures, which are changing and challenging the 
existing financial power structure. 
  
However, the retail sector is not the only threat to the more 
traditional banking and financial sectors. Car manufacturers, for 
instance, have found that the development of finance houses, for 
car credit, has been an anecdote to tighter margins in recent 
years. GM capital provides another example of multinational 
corporate finance houses.  
 
 
ALTERNATIVE AND COMPLIMENTARY CURRENCIES 
 
Another threat, of course, is the development of alternative and 
complementary currencies. Edward De Bono, whilst writing for 
the Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation in 1993, had 
UDLVHG WKH IXWXUH FRQFHSW RI WKH µ,%0 'ROODU¶ RU ODUJH
corporation Dollar that might appear in generalized circulation. 
The idea was that a corporate currency could be linked to (future) 
company products and, a secondary market could ensure 
PLQLPXP ULVN IRU KROGLQJ ,Q WKLV PDQQHU WKH µWDUJHWHG WLHG
FXUUHQF\¶ FRXOG LQVXUH DJDLQVW LQIODWLRQ (Bono 1993). David 
Boyle has also suggested something similar to the concept of 
corporate money, that of new money systems for large urban 
centres such as London. These would effectively form a 
µUHJLRQal-FRUSRUDWLRQ¶ PRQH\ FRYHULQJ VLJQLILFDQW H[SHQGLWXUH
items within that region, such as transport and local economic 
exchanges (Boyle 2000).  Examples already exist with the Oyster 
card system in London and the Octopus cards in Hong Kong, 
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which can be used to purchase non-transport items. Similar 
systems are been applied in other cities around the world, one of 
the most recent being in Dubai. The Oyster and Octopus systems 
do not really perform the full functionality of a duel currency 
system suggested by Boyle that can operate alongside existing 
financial systems. Possibly the closest example of such as system 
LV WKH µ:LU¶ V\VWHP LQ 6ZLW]HUODQG ³:LU - short for 
Wirtschaftsring (economic circle) - is Europe's oldest barter 
network, aimed specifically at smaller companies, and is now so 
widespread in Switzerland that it amounts to a virtual currency in 
parallel to the Swiss franc. Wir started in 1934, the brainchild of 
two followers of the economist Silvio Gesell, who urged the 
creation of negative interest currencies. By 1993, it had a 
turnover of £12 billion and 65,000 corporate members (Boyle 
2002). Alternative and complementary currencies, from local 
authority and grassroots sources, have both received much more 
interest of late as a result of the widespread uncertainties 
surrounding the financial systemic vulnerabilities.   
 
A large city can have enough participation and economic activity 
to generate its own duel currency, to compete with and 
complement the existing formal currency and financial system. 
However, the same may also be true with dispersed groups that 
engage in mutual exchanges, say commercial or socializing 
networks that use the Internet to shrink the distances between the 
participants. Technology innovations are set to continue, making 
deep changes in the financial services sectors. The next 
technological evolution of the Internet ± Web2.0, for instance, is 
set to have a big impact on the range and type of financial 
services that will emerge, as well as bringing in even more new 
entrants to the financial services market place. 
 
Interesting examples of corporate networking financial systems 
have emerged as well as a host of voucher systems. Examples 
include book and music vouchers, retailer vouchers (e.g. Tesco, 
Wal Mart vouchers etc), and Airmiles. An interesting 
FROODERUDWLRQ RI µYRXFKHUV¶ KDV HPHUJHG LQ ,UHODQG ZLWK WKH
µ2QHDOO*LIW9RXFKHU¶ZKLFKXVHVWKHRQHYRXFKHUIRU
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retail outlets. This has recently been expanded to some parts of 
the UK and Malta. Again these city systems and networking 
systems are driven and supported by the information and 
communication technology at the heart of the IR2. 
THE BANKING SECTOR FIGHTS BACK! 
 
Notwithstanding these threats to their core activities, there have 
also been several innovations initiating from the banking sector 
itself. Changes include ATMs, call centres, telephone services 
and internet banking. There have also been many new innovative 
financial instruments such as futures and derivatives which offer 
DµTXLFNWXUQURXQG¶RIILQDQFLDOSURGXFWV for large investors. The 
repackaging and reselling of sub-prime mortgages is another 
recent and topical example. Yet, whilst the banking sector has 
been innovative in their core markets, an increased level of 
abstraction of money and increased customer distance has 
occurred as finance becomes more divorced from actual 
production.  The corporations appear to be filling the gap. 
 
In a speech at the Philadelphia Federal Policy forum in 
November 2007, Governor Randall Kroszner discussed some of 
the innovations and challenges within financial markets, 
particularly relevant in the wake of the sub-prime mortgage 
crisis. Kroszner argued that sufficient information about financial 
innovations is paramount for stakeholders in order to clearly 
understand the (real) risk and maintain market stability. It has 
been recognized that a major failing, prior to the sub-prime 
debacle, was the AAA investment grade rating given to the 
securities when the rating agencies were not (legally) required to 
carry out an appropriate credit risk assessment.  In this instance 
the state regulators have clearly lagged behind the innovators. 
$QRWKHU PDMRU VWUDQG RI *RYHUQRU .URV]QHU¶V VSHHFK ZDV WKH
need for the standardization of financial instruments. 
Standardisation, it is argued, will improve the information 
needed to support stakeholders in understanding market risks and 
facilitate market stability. Yet, despite their advantages, the latent 
IR2 corporafinance processes, therefore, are likely to lead to 
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even more innovation and, by implication, more instability until 
WKHFXUUHQFLHVUHDFKDµFULWLFDOPDVV¶RIVRFLDODFFHSWDQFH 
 
It seems clear that corporations are developing their own 
financial instruments, in parallel to the financial services, which 
is evident from the proliferation of voucher systems and 
electronic transactions by the retailers and wider corporations. I 
have used the term corporafinance to describe these 
developments, derived from the wider retail and corporate market 
VSDFHV ,Q 0DU[¶V WLPH LQ WKH UHFHQW DIWHUPDWK RI WKH IR, 
industrial capital concepts were based on the production of 
physical commodities. In IR2, however, the focus is more service 
and information centred. As such, the industrial capital of IR1 
has evolved into the corporafinance of IR2, as individual 
capitalists seek to secure a larger proportion of surplus value.  
These latent corporate monetary systems, or corporafinance, are 
also challenging prevailing monetary theory. Banking and 
monetary text books will also need to be rewritten as the new 
corporafinance system is (perhaps) poised to replace the present 
financial system ± WKHµZULWLQJLVDOUHDG\RQWKHZDOO¶ 
 
This market view of the emergence of corporafinance could also 
be considered as a variant of Hayek¶V free banking proposals. 
The natural progression of a Hayekian philosophy, where 
currencies are determined by a free market, would be an 
explosion of increasingly abstract levels of money, from the 
banking and financial sectors, in conjunction with any corporate 
monies and complementary currencies (Houghton-Budd 2005). 
However, the increasing volume and abstraction, without 
margins of safety, could lead to a point where there is substantial 
(at least in the short-term) systemic risk. The increased abstracted 
volume of money will surpass sustainability and a potential crash 
will collapse the banking and financial sector in a debt deflation. 
In the Hayek view, of course, the money competition in a 
relatively free market, would eventually deliver a system that 
achieves the common trust necessary for stable money and fewer 
currencies. It could be argued, therefore, that the industrial 
capital, or corporafinance system, since it has a more solid 
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foundation - dealing directly with commodity items, is more 
likely to become predominant in the event of a major crash. Yet, 
there might be substantial damage before this occurs. 
Furthermore, this is problematic since, as Handy noted, firms are 
not democracies but autocracies (Handy 1992). It is a central 
concern of this chapter that these corporafinance processes 
would lead to a concentration of power amongst the corporations, 
with a subsequent (state) democratic deficit.   
 
It can be reasonable safely concluded WKDW 0DU[¶V YLHw of 
LQGXVWULDO FDSLWDO µVXEMXJDWLQJ¶ WKH SULYDWH EDQNLQJ VWUXFWXUH DV
capitalism evolves, seems to be a correct one. It is not claimed, 
however, that Marx is the sole antecedent of the contemporary 
notion. Edward de Bono, for instance, had posited the future 
possibility of corporate currencies and Bernard Lietaer had also 
suggested the same possible scenario. Yet, Marx can probably be 
considered to be the earliest proponent of the view.  
 
The chapter has also introduced the concept of corporafinance 
and argued that this term denotes the growing strength of 
corporate finance, relative to traditional retail and investment 
banking. As the corporates (manufacturers, internet firms and 
retailers) encroach on the bankers core activities they force them 
to increasingly compete on cost, leading to distanced customers. 
This further undermines their sustainability since the corporate 
entities offer new services and closer customer interaction. 
 
The sustainability of the banking industry, therefore, seems 
shakier than in previous decades. If there is a collapse in the 
banking sector then corporafinance could step in and replace the 
banking infrastructure as the prime power of capital. In the 
absence of a collapse then the trend is still towards a more insular 
banking industry, more abstract sources of funds and a riskier 
monetary base. It is further concluded that the trend in industry 
and the non-banking sectors is towards a more stable monetary 
foundation, supported with innovations and closer contact with 
customers and commodities. Industrial capital, in this scenario, 
might well subjugate financial capital by stealth. Yet, it is argued, 
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this will inevitably lead to a democratic deficit and the increasing 
centralization of social power in the hands of industrial capital.  
In the light of these developments it is worth mentioning that a 
notable strand of the monetary reform movement, binary 
economics, seeks to address these matters directly by introducing 
SURSRVDOV IRU WKH µVRFLDOLVDWLRQ RI FDSLWDO¶ ZKHUHE\ FRUSRUDWH
power (and incomes) would become diffused across society 
(Shakespeare 2002). This should facilitate a justice agenda. 
 
 
BINARY ECONOMICS 
 
Monetary reformers generally posit that financial (social) power 
is, as expected, mainly located amongst a transnational rentier 
class whose financial assets are invested within the private 
banking system. In addition to the accumulation of these assets 
the private bankers also control the creation process of credit-
money that constitutes an increasing proportion of global monies. 
Binary economists, as a particular grouping of monetary 
reformers, also propound these views and subsequently aim to 
reassert a stronger (and interventionist) state that can regain some 
of this financial power, in order to facilitate a specific social 
agenda. The key advantage of their proposals, however, is that 
they recommend that the present capitalist order remains intact, 
operated on market principles, but that future capital investments 
are given a (gradual) broader common ownership. It is also 
hoped that these transformations would not be disruptive yet, 
lead to a democratisation of financial power since capital-based 
incomes will be socially extended. It is this key difference that 
separates these ideas from those of other reformers. Furthermore, 
this links up ZLWK 0DU[¶V EHOLHI WKDW WKH URRW RI H[SORLWDWLRQ LV
found in the private ownership of capital. If private capital can be 
socialized, therefore, many of the contradictions within society 
can be removed and basic incomes provided for all, including for 
those people presently under-compensated (children and women, 
for instance) by the market system. Binary economics has been 
based upon the seminal work of Louis Kelso and continues to be 
developed and promulgated by several adherents ± notably 
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Rodney Shakespeare (Kelso 1958; Shakespeare 2007). Their 
QRWLRQ RI WKH µHFRQRPLF SUREOHP¶ LV WKDW WR YDU\LQJ GHJUHHV
states have under-utilised resources, concentrated capital 
ownership and widespread wants/needs. It is assumed that 
incomes are derived from both capital and labour (hence the term 
binary) and further suggest that labour incomes are only capable 
of purchasing a small proportion of total output. New capital 
investment and the state consume a further portion and the rest is 
hoarded, leaving credit expansion to aid the sustainability of the 
capitalist order. This is regarded as entirely unsatisfactory since it 
perpetuates debt accumulation, capitalist crises and uneven 
development. As outlined earlier, the credit expansion enables 
sustenance of the capitalist system yet, also leads to an 
accumulation of financial power that threatens to engender the 
formation of a deepening plutocratic power elite. 
 
The binary  proposals, conversely, LQWHQG WR FUHDWH µHIIHFWLYH
SDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶ E\ EURDGHQLQJ WKH RZQHUVKLS Ease of productive 
capital, within the present confines of the capitalist order, and 
encourage the formation of new capital with a broader social 
ownership. This is to be financed by state-LVVXHG µLQWHUHVW-IUHH¶
debt. The concentration of capital ownership is to be discouraged 
and the use of credit diminished. The debt principal is to be paid 
from incomes derived from the capital acquisition and when the 
monies are paid they are cancelled thus leaving an ongoing 
income for the capital recipient. It is argued that this would be 
counter-inflationary providing there is spare capacity and money 
H[SDQVLRQPDWFKHVQHZSURGXFWLRQ$OVRLWLVFODLPHGµLQWHUHVW-
IUHH¶ SULFHV LQ JHQHUDO ZLOO EH ORZHU 7R PDWFK WKH µFRXQWHU-
LQIODWLRQDU\¶WHQGHQF\LWLVIXUWKHUSURSRVHG that public works are 
funded by state-LVVXHGFUHGLWDQGWKDWVRPHµGHEW-IUHH¶PRQH\LV
FUHDWHGWRDFKLHYHWKHµDSSURSULDWH¶EDODQFHLQWKHPRQH\VXSSO\
These are, of course, radical proposals if implemented in full and, 
subsequently, have received little political support. These anti-
inflation arguments, as previously mentioned, are based on the 
VXEVWDQWLDO µLQIODWLRQ-HIIHFW¶ WKDW LQWHUHVW H[HUWV RQ WKH ILQDQFLDO
order in the modern era. It is further argued that repayment of 
interest and principal engenders pressure for increased economic 
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DFWLYLW\ WKDW GRHV QRW IROORZ D µQDWXUDO¶ JURZWK SDWWHUQ 7KH
detrimental effects of this are innumerable. So, are these binary 
proposals, or indeed other monetary reform ideas, likely to be 
politically achievable? 
 
REALPOLITIK 
 
 The simply answer to this question is that, as Walter has noted, in 
 the absence of a financial crisis there is unlikely to be any radical  
                     change to the status quo (Walter 1993). One of the key reasons 
for this is psychological, people are fearful of change and the 
personal agendas of those that promote it. Many people, for 
instance, who are unfortunate enough to find themselves as 
victims of some form of social abuse, will often prefer the 
familiarity of current circumstances to the possibility of an 
improvement that is derived from the support of a radical agenda. 
Another key factor is the plurality of (social) powers that exist in 
modern societies. Susan Strange, for instance, has identified four 
(contemporary) primary structures of power; that of finance, 
political, production and knowledge, and also noted several 
secondary sources (Strange 1988). With such a delicate power 
balance it is, therefore, extremely unlikely that radicalised 
agendas will be pursued in their purest form without a substantial 
measure of compromise.  
 
It is for this reason that the ideas of Keynes, expressed by post-
Keynesians, offer (arguably) more appropriate solutions to the 
problems discussed. Post-Keynesians, such as Chick, Davidson 
and Tily, are a group of economists who have sought to 
reformulate and develop the original (monetary) ideas of Keynes, 
as opposed to tradiWLRQDO µ.H\QHVLDQV¶ ZKRKDG merely utilised 
his (selected) ideas and then synthesised them with more 
mainstream economic ideas (Tily 2007). These ideas have also 
informed the current campaigning work of Ann Pettifor (Jubilee 
caPSDLJQLQKHUDVSLUDWLRQVWRZDUGVµILQDQFLDOUHQHZDO¶DQGWKH
µJUHHQGHDO¶(Pettifor 2006).   
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At the outset of his career, whilst serving the UK treasury at the 
Treaty of Versailles in 1919, Keynes demonstrated an awareness 
of the latent disruptive capability of the financial system, (and 
hence monetary sources of social power) through his 
identification of the (unsustainable) German debt reparations 
problem. Later, of course, default broke the chain of payments 
necessary to maintain confidence in the international financial 
system and, the subsequent credit squeeze contributed to falling 
stock priFHV DQG WKH GHSUHVVLRQ \HDUV .H\QHV¶ GHVLUH IRU
economic stability, using government intervention, appears to 
KDYHEHHQDFRQVLVWHQW WKHPH WKURXJKRXW WKHµSROLF\¶DVSHFWVRI
his work. His key contribution to economic thought, for instance, 
was arguably hiVFKDOOHQJHWR6D\¶VODZ± that µsupply creates its 
own demand¶ ± suggesting that the macro-economy could, 
LQVWHDGVHWWOHLQµXQGHU-HPSOR\PHQW¶HTXLOLEULXP+HFRQVLGHUHG
this to be inefficient, with further social costs associated with 
unemployment. He subsequently advocated the use of fiscal and 
monetary policies in order to stabilize the trade cycle and 
stimulate (or mitigate) effective demand to establish full-
employment and, theorized this using his particular economic 
models. Keynes had generally favoured state intervention, in 
order to ensure the prevalence of low interest rates (cheap 
money), so that excessive (private) banking surpluses were 
restricted and the growth of the productive economy was 
supported. He further recommended credit controls in order to 
SUHYHQW µFKHDS PRQH\¶ IDFLOLWDWLQJ VSHFXODWLYH EXEEOHV LQ DVVHW
markets. In order to enhance state monetary capabilities, he 
further advocated capital controls for international transactions, 
to avoid capital flight towards states with higher interest rates. As 
one of the chief architects of the post-WW2 Bretton Woods 
system, for instance, he had managed to obtain this objective 
whilst remaining unsuccessful in the establishment of Bancor 
(his own proposal for a world bank), with its global currency unit 
based on a currency basket, which had aimed to stabilize the 
balance of payments through the discouragement of trading 
surpluses and deficits between states.  
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In these overall matters, of course, though Keynes had promoted 
an agenda that challenged the mainstream economists, he fell 
short of the monetary reform movement proposals. His ideas left 
much of the modus operandi of capitalism, and the debt-based 
money system, intact. In an open letter to Roosevelt during the 
depression, for instance, Keynes had warned against the state 
taking a pro-active role in money-issue (Zarlenga 2002). Yet, in 
defence of Keynes, it could be argued that he spent much of his 
time in the company of influential policy-makers and, as a result, 
was particularly conscious of the need to compromise.  Be that as 
it may, the present proposals of Anne Pettifor et al have a broad 
level of support in the United Kingdom and are, therefore, more 
likely to succeed in the absence of a crisis than the reformers. 
This is partly because they appeal to the popular sentiment of 
nostalgia that harks back to the so-callHGµJROGHQDJH¶HUDRIWKH
VL[WLHV 'XULQJ WKLV µE\-JRQH¶ .H\QHVLDQ WLPH RI ORZ LQWHUHVW
rates, the growth, income and employment rates were all rising. 
The circumstances of today are, of course, very different.  
 
To conclude the chapter, I now turn to the consideration of a 
development bank proposal that, it is hoped, offers a partial 
solution to the tragedy of extreme poverty, and lack of 
empowerment, that exists in many areas of the world today. 
 
  
A MICRO-INVESTMENT BANK 
 
Over the last two decades, there has been increasing interest in 
the role of non-government microfinance institutions in the 
developing world, as a means of alleviating poverty and 
facilitating development. The World Bank, for instance, is now a 
supporter of these modes of credit provision. Microfinance 
involves the provision of small loans to aspiring and latent 
entrepreneurs who, in turn, stimulate economic activity and, it is 
hoped, aid development. Newer forms of microcredit emerged as 
a response to the problems people experienced in the developing 
world, when trying to obtain credit, if they were lower down the 
income (or collateral) scale. Potential lenders faced insufficient 
36 
 
information for risk evaluation and the small size of these loans 
rendered them cost ineffective (Hulme 1996). As a result, the 
poorest people were often not able to obtain the finance which 
would have otherwise instigated socially beneficial projects. 
During the sixties and seventies, finance institutions sponsored 
by governments (and their agencies) had sought to meet this need 
and provided microcredit, but arrears rates soon became high. 
The forces that were lobbying for the liberalization of finance at 
the time (such as the Ohio school) viewed this as a failure of state 
bureaucratic processes and, subsequently, advocated the private 
sector (and market interest rates) as a suitable vehicle (Mouatt 
1997). In addition, the Ohio school claimed that the use of 
VXEVLG\ E\ LQVWLWXWLRQV HQFRXUDJHG µSROLWLFDO PDQLSXODWLRQ¶
Conversely, as the extensive Hulme and Mosley study revealed, 
there are many institutions that have successfully utilized credit 
subsidies and, targeted lending effectively. If certain design 
features are adhered to then lower long-run costs and default 
rates can lead to lower interest rates and the elimination of 
subsidy (Hulme 1996). The use of women groups, peer pressure 
and local knowledge, for instance, have all helped to improve 
these matters, as the famous Grameen bank has discovered. 
 
However, for the cynical amongst us, recent microcredit 
provision could also be seen as an instrument for drawing 
increasing numbers of people in the developing world into the 
various modes of capitalist behavior, and debt-based money 
system, that exist in the West (Weber 2006). Many areas of the 
GHYHORSLQJ ZRUOG SUHVHQWO\ H[SHULHQFH PXFK PRUH µFRPPXQDO¶
economies, often with complementary currency systems, than 
occur in the developed world. It could be argued these offer 
superior models for social existence. Bernard Lietaer, for 
instance, has provided a good case study of such a society in 
Bali, that uses its Nayahan Banjar alternative currency(Lietaer 
2003). It is hoped that future microfinance institutions would be 
able to work in tandem with such practices. 
 
My proposal (I have coined the phrase Integrity Trust), for a 
micro investment bank model, aims to build on the success and 
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innovation of these microcredit organizations mentioned above. 
The recommendation is to set up a charitable status 
organization(s) in the developed world, with the express aim of 
raising sufficient funds to provide the asset base for an individual 
micro investment bank (or multiple branches) in a pre-specified 
location in the developing world. Whilst it is recognized that 
many people (and organizations) in the developed world are 
H[SHULHQFLQJ µDLG IDWLJXH¶ DW SUHVHQW it is also hoped (and 
presumed) that many others are keen to donate funds but, are 
often concerned about the manner in which the money is used. In 
order to overcome this valid objection it is suggested that the 
bank-charity adopts a constitutional principle to provide 
complete transparency in all of its financial dealings, in addition 
to those required by the relevant legislation. With the advent of 
modern telecommunications technology, of course, this has 
become much easier. It is, therefore, recommended that a website 
be constructed that could provide any interested party with 
instant access to comprehensive jargon-free information on all 
book-keeping activities and records. Since money has so often 
been the cause of social distress in human history, the value of 
transparency in financial dealings cannot, in my opinion, be 
under-estimated. 
  
Once funds have reached the required level, the plan is to make 
the monies available to a trusted (individual) partner, in the 
particular region of the developing world, where a personal 
relationship has already been established. This person would 
have complete responsibility for administering the account, for a 
specified remuneration, and make decisions regarding the 
granting of credit, in accordance with certain specified criteria. 
Yet, in contradistinction to other microfinance institutions, it is 
proposed that the loans are provided completely interest-free. 
The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, the credit would provide 
an opportunity to model the viability of many of the claims of the 
monetary reform movement, albeit on a much smaller scale. 
Secondly, the lending is likely to be much more acceptable to 
indigenous communities, and their traditional economic 
practices, and those with religious or philanthropic convictions. 
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At first glance, it appears that the proposed micro investment 
bank fund would, over time, be gradually depleted. Even given 
fortuitous circumstances, with no default on lending and the 
absence of corruption or theft, the administration costs would 
eventually diminish the fund. To combat this, the proposal is to 
instigate the requirement (similar to Islamic finance) that all 
(successful) businesses established, have to pay a percentage of 
their net profit to the bank, in addition to any principal repaid. 
This, it is further argued, should also be paid for a pre-specified 
period of time. The key advantage of this proposal is that the 
social responsibility of entrepreneurs is enhanced, as monies are 
re-circulated in order to assist the entrepreneurs of the future.  
As far as the donors in the West are concerned, it is further 
suggested that they have the advantage of tracking the usefulness 
of their gift by logging on to the relevant website and, observing 
the success (or failure) of the particular beneficiaries and their 
specific activities.  
 
Finally, it is proposed that in the event of default, or even theft, 
the loans extended are simply written off. It could be argued that 
this encourages irresponsible lending, known as moral hazard, as 
well as providing an incentive for corruption. However, it is my 
conviction that the transparent nature of the banking activities, 
including the details of the beneficiaries, would mitigate this as a 
result of the community peer pressure. Much would also depend 
on the particular skills, and qualities, of the fund administrator. In 
any case, since the monies are initially provided by charitable 
donation, there are not the same levels of obligation that are 
usually associated with investors. 
 
To conclude, it is not suggested that this model is a global 
panacea for the difficulties faced by those in the developing 
world. Yet, it is hoped that the model would make some 
contribution towards a concerted effort to reform capitalism, in 
the developing countries, from several angles. Indeed, the 
achievement of social and economic justice, in the capitalist 
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world of today, most likely requires the mustering of multilateral 
and multi-faceted forces. Let us join together in this struggle. 
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